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Abstract
This study investigates the effects of task demonstrability and replacing a human advisor 
with a machine advisor. Outcome measures include advice-utilization (trust), the percep-
tion of advisors, and decision-maker emotions. Participants were randomly assigned to 
make a series of forecasts dealing with either humanitarian planning (low demonstrability) 
or management (high demonstrability). Participants received advice from either a machine 
advisor only, a human advisor only, or their advisor was replaced with the other type of 
advisor (human/machine) midway through the experiment. Decision-makers rated human 
advisors as more expert, more useful, and more similar. Perception effects were strongest 
when a human advisor was replaced by a machine. Decision-makers also experienced more 
negative emotions, lower reciprocity, and faulted their advisor more for mistakes when a 
human was replaced by a machine.
Keywords: human-machine communication, interpersonal communication, advice, 
task demonstrability, emotion
Introduction
On August 13, 2014, a video titled Humans Need Not Apply was uploaded to YouTube and 
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over 10 million views (CGPGrey, 2014; Pagano, 2014). Detailing a future in which human 
labor is irrecoverably taken over by automation, the 15-minute video on the evolution of 
labor—and why the robot revolution is different—was described as “terrifying” and fore-
telling “an economic horror movie” by some commentators (Roggeveen, 2014, p. 1). Since 
then, public interest in the continued automation of human labor has only increased; it is 
becoming difficult to read the business section of a popular newspaper and not encounter 
an article discussing the future of work and automation. Emerging alongside the increased 
discussion of machines versus humans, human-machine communication is a quickly grow-
ing subfield of communication which studies machines as interlocutors rather than simply 
as communication tools (Banks & de Graaf, 2020; Fortunati & Edwards, 2020). This study 
draws upon both interpersonal and human-machine trust literature to investigate a com-
mon real-world use for new automation: acting as an advisor to a human decision-maker. 
Industries as diverse as health care (Langlotz et al., 2019), finance (Lourenço et al., 2020), 
supply-chain management (Fildes & Goodwin, 2020), and agriculture (Zhai et al., 2020) 
are increasingly turning toward machines as advisors. In financial advising, for example, 
robo-advisors currently manage an estimated $1 trillion in assets, a number that is expected 
to increase to over $15 trillion by 2025 (Abraham et al., 2019; Deloitte, 2016).
The interpersonal process of trust has attracted considerable interest from scholars in 
a wide variety of fields (for review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). More recently, the study of 
human-machine trust has also increased (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Lutz & Tamò-Larrieux, 2020). 
There is also scholarship emerging that attempts to explain the differences in how human 
and machine communicators are conceptualized (Guzman, 2020). However, little research 
has experimentally compared human-machine trust directly to interpersonal trust, espe-
cially in situations where machines replace humans or for decisions with more subjective 
and less demonstrable consequences. Given that the thought of machines replacing humans 
concerns many people, it is surprising how little research exists on the psychological state of 
people who witness machines replacing humans. The purpose of this study is to investigate 
(1) the effects of task demonstrability on trust in humans and machines, (2) how percep-
tions of advisors are affected by task type, advisor type, and advisor replacement. We begin 
by conceptualizing differences in task demonstrability and advisor expertise. 
Task Demonstrability and Advisor Expertise
A continuum of decision-making task demonstrability anchored by intellective (high 
demonstrability) and judgmental tasks (low demonstrability) was explicated by Laugh-
lin and Ellis (1986). This theoretical distinction has become important in advice research 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Demonstrable tasks are distinguished by having an answer that 
all parties can understand. For example, an algebra problem has a correct answer and any 
advice provided to a decision-maker suggesting a correct answer is demonstrably correct 
or incorrect. On the other hand, low demonstrability tasks involve uncertain future states 
or subjective consequences, and the decision is seen more as a value judgment than a cor-
rect answer. Several interpersonal advice studies have varied decision-making tasks on the 
demonstrability continuum (Tzioti et al., 2014; Van Swol, 2011). 
One of the strongest and most robust effects in advice research is that perceptions of 
advisor expertise directly affect trust in the advisor (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). Given 
Prahl and Lan Swol 211
that task demonstrability and advisor expertise are key constructs in interpersonal advice 
research, human-machine communication provides an ideal context to study how the 
two factors may interact because the expertise of an advisor is tied to the domain and 
decision-making context. This suggests that perceptions of expertise for low or high demon-
strability of tasks may differ for humans and machines. In the research presented here, 
we manipulate both advisor type (human/machine) and demonstrability of the decision- 
making task. Decades of research on technology acceptance, human-automation 
(human-machine) trust, and the growing field of machine ethics provides some theoretical 
insight as to how perceptions of machine attributes differ from humans.
Perceptions of Machines and Perceptions of Humans
The comparison of interpersonal and human-machine trust in tasks of varying demonstra-
bility, especially those involving moral decisions, introduces an interesting question about 
the match between advisor characteristics and the context of a decision. The majority of 
human-machine advice research has used highly demonstrable tasks as experimental stim-
uli, such as what the next number is in a mathematical sequence (de Visser et al., 2016) or 
a yes/no question regarding the presence of military equipment in an aerial surveillance 
photo (Rice & Geels, 2010). There exists little research to guide our assumptions about 
trust of machine advisors on less demonstrable tasks. However, machines may need to 
make such decisions in the future, such as a self-driving car that must decide to protect 
vehicle occupants at the cost of endangering pedestrians (Awad et al., 2018). Although not 
focused on specific decisions, some scholars have investigated perceptions of various forms 
of machines (e.g., robots) for varying roles in society (Katz & Halpern, 2014; Takayama et 
al., 2008). Machines are often perceived as being more suitable for roles that do not require 
emotion or sensitive communication, and more suitable for roles that require memoriza-
tion and unselfish service-orientation (Takayama et al., 2008). 
Several perspectives in human-machine communication literature highlight the 
importance of the different expectations between humans and machines (Gambino et al., 
2020; Guzman, 2020; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). For example, according to the per-
fect automation schema model (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007), automation is expected to 
be high performing but invariant, whereas humans (if not as high performing) are adapt-
able and are expected to learn from their mistakes. Additionally, mistakes are less expected 
from machines in general because decision-makers do not see machines as susceptible to 
biases and emotions that plague human judgment (Merritt et al., 2015). On the other hand, 
people know that other people are not perfect. Several authors in human-robot trust have 
investigated questions of emotion, but there is only limited evidence that humans consider 
machines to possess emotion (Guzman, 2020; Kahn et al., 2012). 
If human and machine advisors are perceived as having differing fundamental attri-
butes, it will affect the perception of either advisor’s capabilities. It follows that when an 
advisor is not assessed to have expertise (i.e., capabilities required for a certain task), the 
assessments of the advisor that are dependent on the task will be affected as well. Because less 
demonstrable tasks require value judgments that, in turn, are tied to emotion and subjective 
evaluation (Horberg et al., 2011), we believe that the underlying assumption that machines 
lack emotion will lead to lower assessment of advisor expertise in less demonstrable tasks.
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Hypothesis 1a: Machine advisors will be perceived as having less expertise in 
less demonstrable decision tasks than more demonstrable tasks.
Perceptions of advisor expertise also affect perceptions of the advice itself. If advice 
comes from non-expert sources, it is perceived as less useful and less appropriate. This effect 
is both logical and established in past advice research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).
Hypothesis 1b/c: Advice from machine advisors will be perceived as being less 
(1b) useful (1c) appropriate in less demonstrable than more demonstrable deci-
sion tasks.
Task, Advisor, Trust, and Perception
In the experiment below, we attempt to control factors like task that moderate the relation-
ship between perceptions of the advice and advisor expertise, therefore we expect to see the 
effects of hypotheses 1a–1c reflected in our behavioral trust measure (advice-utilization) as 
well, especially as advice utilization and perception of advice are measured closely in time 
and previous research has found a strong relationship between perception of advice and use 
of advice (Bonaccio & Van Swol, 2014).
Hypothesis 2: Machine advice will be utilized less than human advice, in  
general, when the decision is less demonstrable.
Our third hypothesis is reasoned from hypotheses 1 and 2. Because different tasks may 
result in different advisor characteristics becoming more salient, we predict that recipient 
perceptions of thought process and value similarity with human advisors will be higher 
in less demonstrable decision tasks because the task is thought to be better suited to a 
decision-maker that possesses emotion.
Hypothesis 3a/b: Human/machine advisors will be perceived as having more 
(3a) thought process and (3b) value similarity in less demonstrable decision 
tasks.
Advisor Replacement
In the research study below, we manipulate advisor type, task type, and advisor replace-
ment. There is essentially no interpersonal or machine trust research that has been con-
ducted specifically to test the effects of advisor replacement, but because perception of 
humans and machine relies on different underlying assumptions, perceptual effects related 
to the comparison of two stimuli may be applicable to guide our expectations. When one 
advisor is replaced by another type, this may elicit a comparison of the two advisors that 
makes the perceived attributes of both more salient. Such an effect would fit into exist-
ing literature on contrast effects in communication and impression formation research 
(Palmer & Gore, 2014). 
Contrast effects describe the process by which exposure to one target of evaluation can 
change the evaluation of targets presented subsequently. For example, unattractive faces are 
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rated as more unattractive if the evaluator is shown an attractive face before the unattractive 
one (Wedell et al., 1987). We are not aware of any literature to suggest that contrast effects 
will not extend to the evaluation of one advisor after replacing another. If a contrast effect is 
found, we expect it to result in our hypothesized effects of advisor type becoming stronger. 
For example, if a decision-maker is presented with a new machine advisor after gaining 
experience with a human advisor, it may result in an even stronger perception of invariance 
and exaggerate expectations of high performance. To be clear, we only manipulate advisor 
replacement, we do not replace one task with another; our hypothesis below therefore only 
covers effects driven by advisor perception. For brevity, we summarize these effects in the 
below hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a/b: Machine/human advisors will be evaluated as less expert, use-
ful, appropriate, and similar in less/more demonstrable decision tasks when they 
replace human/machine advisors than when replacing another machine/human 
advisor.
Hypothesis 4c/d: In more/less demonstrable tasks, when a machine/human 
advisor replaces a human/machine advisor, the machine/human advice will be 
utilized more than when a machine/human advisor replaces another machine/
human advisor.
Decision-Maker Emotions
Our earlier discussion of emotions primarily discussed a decision-maker’s perception that 
an advisor possesses emotions or at least the capability to understand emotions. But per-
ceptual processes themselves are affected by emotions, and interpersonal advice research 
has shown decision-maker emotions to have substantial effects on trust (MacGeorge et al., 
2013). In interpersonal advice research using demonstrable tasks, researchers have manipu-
lated decision-maker emotions, finding that the induction of other-directed negative emo-
tions (i.e., anger, frustration) resulted in less advice utilization, while other-directed positive 
emotions (i.e., happiness, gratitude) resulted in more utilization (Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). 
Such effects were also found in research using less demonstrable tasks (de Hooge et al., 
2014).
Research on the effects of decision-maker emotions and trust in machines is less con-
clusive about the effects of emotions on trust. This is largely because advisor anthropomor-
phism can have strong effects on emotion (de Visser et al., 2016; Waytz et al., 2014), and 
there are large differences in anthropomorphism for machines (i.e., a social robot versus 
a calculator). Because we do not manipulate decision-maker emotion in our study, we are 
only able to predict potential effects that result from our manipulations advisor type and 
task, but our study design is ideally suited to investigate the emotions that may be produced 
by interacting with human versus machine advisors and the effects of replacing one advisor 
with another. A human being replaced by a machine, for example, could produce a negative 
emotional reaction due to the belief that the machine is not suited for the decision task or 
vice versa. Thus, we incorporate measures of positive emotions (e.g., happiness) and nega-
tive emotions (e.g., anger).
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In addition to emotions, we also measure two processes related to trust: reciprocity and 
fault. Reciprocity—the belief of owing something to one’s advisor—is interesting because 
trust is often conceptualized as a reciprocal process (Mayer et al., 1995). We also examine 
attributions of fault for mistakes because if humans are expected to be fallible and imper-
fect (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007), it may result in decision-makers generally finding 
less fault in human advisors’ mistakes. We are also interested in fault because it is possible 
that decision-makers will fault machines to a greater degree than human advisors because 
fault may be related to blame. Our low demonstrability decision task in this experiment has 
consequences that result in the loss of human life, and though the measurement of what is 
perceived as “moral” is complicated, it is not unreasonable to assume that decision-makers 
could sense moral implications. Some research and emerging machine ethics research sug-
gests many humans have a discomfort with placing blame on machines for making deci-
sions with moral implications because many people do not perceive machines to possess 
moral accountability (Kahn et al., 2012), our experimental manipulations offer a unique 
opportunity to investigate this question.
RQ1/2/3: Are decision-maker (1) emotions, (2) reciprocity, and (3) attributions 
of fault affected by task and advisor type?
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service and were 
required to be U.S. citizens over 18. Typical MTurk samples have limitations; for example, 
they tend to be younger and more likely to vote Democratic (Levay et al., 2016), and the use 
of scripts or bots is possible. To minimize potential problems, we first specified that sub-
jects were “Master” workers (have a history of providing high quality work), and we used 
MTurk worker qualifications (i.e., age, gender, geographic location) to ensure a sample sim-
ilar to the U.S. general population. Finally, our screening questions on the survey itself were 
set with quotas of demographics such as age and gender as a second layer of verification. 
Throughout the survey, attention and bot check questions were presented at random inter-
vals; any subject failing two or more check questions was eliminated. Power analyses were 
conducted based off of past research (see appendix) and given the very slight manipulations 
present in our research, we recruited a large enough sample to detect effects. A total of 689 
participants completed the study. In the high demonstrability task: n = 321, there were 
n = 80 participants in the machine advisor replaced by machine (MrM), n = 77 in human 
advisor replaced by human (HrH), n = 84 in machine advisor replaced by human advisor 
(MrH), n = 80 in human advisor replaced by machine advisor (HrM). Low demonstrability 
task: n = 368, n = 82 (MrM), n = 74 (HrH), n = 104 (MrH), n = 108 (HrM). 
Task
A forecasting task was chosen to maximize relatability to previous research comparing 
human and machine advice (e.g., Fildes et al., 2006; Önkal et al., 2009), because it allowed 
for the clean manipulations of task demonstrability, and because forecasting is a task for 
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which machines are being increasingly used in the real world, for example, in supply chain 
forecasting (Fildes & Goodwin, 2020). Participants completed 20 forecasting tasks; all 20 
graphs/forecast scenarios were randomly assigned within each task condition. In the high 
task demonstrability condition, the forecasting scenarios related to hospital operating room 
management (screenshots in appendix). In the low task demonstrability condition, the 
same graphs were displayed, but the scenarios dealt with humanitarian relief.1 
Procedure
The manipulation of advisor type was simple and similar to past studies (Önkal et al., 2009; 
Prahl & Van Swol, 2017). Participants were told at the opening that the advice would come 
either from an algorithmic software program (OptiLytics), or an experienced surgeon at 
the hospital in the high demonstrability condition (in the low demonstrability condition, 
a humanitarian relief professional). The advisors were introduced to participants with a 
short photograph describing their/its role in the organization (see appendix for descrip-
tions). Midway (after trial 10), the advisor was replaced with either the same type (human/
machine) or different type of advisor to create the HrH, HrM, MrM, and MrH conditions.2
Compensation for participants was set at 25% above the federal (USA) minimum wage 
rate assuming a 45-minute completion time. Participants were presented graphical repre-
sentations of past data, similar to a stock price chart, and then asked to make an initial fore-
cast of where the value would be in the future. After making an “initial” forecast, the advice 
from a human (or algorithmic) advisor was presented; participants could make a “revised” 
forecast on the screen and submit it as their final forecast.3
At the end of each trial, a performance feedback screen was shown that displayed the 
participant’s final forecast, the advisor’s forecast, and the actual correct answer. Addition-
ally, percentage errors were calculated for each forecast (allowing them to compare their 
own performance versus the advisor’s performance). The participant was also shown their 
average percentage error across all trials so they could see if their performance on the indi-
vidual trial was better or worse than previously. Finally, in the high demonstrability con-
dition, the participant’s percentage error was multiplied by 1000 and presented as (for a 
1% error): “This forecasting error is estimated to have cost the hospital $1000.” In the low 
demonstrability condition, the percentage error was multiplied by 100 and displayed as: 
“This forecasting error is estimated to have resulted in 100 deaths.” This was to reinforce 
that the decisions had either financial consequences or consequences resulting in adver-
sity to humans. The first 10 trials were performed to set the stage for the second group of 
10 trials where our research interest in advisor replacement lies.
1. We picked these domains partially to control for participants having personal intuition for what the 
outcomes would be. Recipients often use advice less if they believe themselves to possess unique domain 
expertise (Lawrence et al., 2006); our task minimizes this risk.
2. When advisors were replaced midway through the survey, the introduction text was preceded by “Due to 
time constraints, we were not able to get [advisor]’s advice for every forecast. Therefore, you will have a new 
advisor to help you on the remaining tasks. Your new advisor is . . . ”
3. Javascript coding was written into the survey to control the accuracy of the participant forecast and advice 
forecast, which was varied slightly between trials. This resulted in the relative performance of the participant 
and the advisor always being the same across all participants to control for related confounds.
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Measures
A measure used in past research to assess behavioral trust, the “SHIFT” variable, was used 
to measure advice-utilization. This measure not only provides commonality with forecast-
ing research and algorithmic advice research (e.g., Önkal et al., 2009), but also commonality 
with interpersonal advice studies which have used the equivalent “Weight of Advice” mea-
sure to assess trust as a behavioral measure (for review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). The 
SHIFT formula is: 
(Judge revised forecast − Judge initial forecast) / (Advisor forecast − Judge initial 
forecast)
A questionnaire was administered to assess perceptions of the advisor (e.g., expertise), 
advice (e.g., appropriateness), and decision-maker emotions, reciprocity, and fault after the 
first set of 10 trials and after the final 10 trials with the replacement advisor.4 The survey, 
consisting of sematic differential and Likert style survey questions, was constructed with 
survey items from previous advice literature (MacGeorge et al., 2013), details of survey 
measures and reliability can be found in the appendix.
Results
Manipulation Checks
To confirm participants perceived the tasks differently, we conducted independent sample 
t tests on our manipulation check questions between tasks. Means and standard deviations 
are displayed in Table 1. The task manipulation was successful.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 stated that machine advice would be perceived as (1a) less expert, (1b) less 
useful, and (1c) less appropriate than human advice in the humanitarian than the manage-
ment task. We conducted two-way ANOVAs for perceptions of advisor expertise, appro-
priateness of advice, and usefulness of advice in the first block (pre-replacement) with 
task type and advisor type as independent variables. There was no significant interaction 
between task type and advisor type for expertise of advisor F(1,669) = 0.062, p = 0.803, 
d = 0.062, appropriateness of advice, F(1,658) = 0.025, p = 0.873, d = 0.058, or usefulness of 
advice, F(1,658) = 0.003, p = 0.998, d = 0.001. Follow-up univariate tests indicated a main 
effect of advisor only: human advice was always perceived as being more expert F(1,669) = 
20.681, p < 0.001, d = 0.356, more appropriate F(1,658) = 53.803, p < 0.001, d = 0.570, and 
more useful F(1,658) = 62.350, p < 0.001, d = 0.616, in the first block of trials. Because the 
main effect of advisor type was significant in the survey results from the first block of trials, 
4. The questionnaire measures were identical and measured perceptions of advice usefulness and advisor 
quality on a sematic differential scale. Additionally, Likert survey questions measured emotions when 
receiving advice, trust of advisor, similarity (value, social norm, and thought process) to advisor, and 
perceptions of advisor effort.
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we could not treat every participant as coming from the same baseline condition when 
completing the second survey. Thus, we created a difference score by subtracting scores in 
the first advisor evaluation from the second. We then conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with 
task type, advisor type, and replacement type as factors. Results indicated no significant 
interaction between the three factors and advice appropriateness, F(1,659) = 1.297, p = 
0.255, d = 0.086; but there was a significant interaction for advice usefulness, F(1,662) = 
5.829, p = 0.016, d = 0.189, and advisor expertise F(1,662) = 3.940, p = 0.048, d = 0.155. 
To understand these interactions, we conducted two-way ANOVAs comparing the 
effect of replacement and advisor type on expertise and advice usefulness within each task. 
In the humanitarian task there was a significant interaction between replacement and advi-
sor type for advisor expertise, F(1,355) = 13.156, p < 0.001, d = 0.288; this interaction was 
not significant in the management task condition, F(1,305) = 0.058, p = 0.810, d = 0.005. 
The interaction analyses were similar for advice usefulness: significant in the humanitarian 
task, F(1,360) = 8.205, p = 0.004, d = 0.0224, but not in the management task, F(1,300) = 
0.605, p = 0.437, d = 0.051. An inspection of the means indicates machine advisors replac-
ing human advisors in the humanitarian task produced the largest decrease in evaluations 
of advisor expertise (M = -0.439, SD = 0.714) and advice usefulness (M = -0.317, SD = 
0.627), whilst human advisors replacing machine advisors produced the largest increase 
in ratings of expertise (M = 0.038, SD = 0.818) and advice usefulness (M = 0.063, SD = 
0.766). Thus, we find partial support for hypothesis 1a and 1b, human advice is perceived as 
more expert and more useful than machine advice in humanitarian decision-making tasks, 
but only when one advisor type has replaced the other. A table detailing the three-factor 
ANOVAs for H1a–c, H3a–b, and our RQs can be found in Table 2; see figures for graphs of 
significant three-way interactions.








Task is more about 
Human Life
  M = 5.573
SD = 1.381
  M = 2.938
SD = 1.554 2.634 0.001* 1.845
Task is more about 
Money
  M = 2.781
SD = 1.283
  M = 4.008
SD = 2.190 1.226 0.001* 1.064
Task has no right 
answers
  M = 2.641
SD = 1.269
  M = 2.349
SD = 1.284 0.293 0.004 0.251
Task requires 
compassion
  M = 3.424
SD = 1.761
  M = 3.058
SD = 1.363 0.365 0.002* 0.334
Task relevant to all 
humans
  M = 3.831
SD = 2.061
  M = 3.265
SD = 1.446 0.567 0.001* 0.301
Task relevant to me 
personally
  M = 2.961
SD = 1.060
  M = 2.954
SD = 1.155 0.007 0.960 0.005
* Signifies Levine’s test for equality of variances violated, equal variances not assumed test statistics used.
** Cohen’s d effect size (maximum likelihood estimator).
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FIGURE 1 Advisor Expertise Change from Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more perceived advisor expertise with second advisor
Negative values = less perceived advisor expertise with second advisor
FIGURE 2 Advice Usefulness Change from Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more perceived advice usefulness with second advisor
Negative values = less perceived advice usefulness with second advisor
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Hypothesis 2 stated that in the less demonstrable task (humanitarian), machine advice 
would be used less, in general, than human advice. Because all participants started the 
first 10 trials with a human or machine advisor, we first conducted a 2 (humanitarian/ 
management task) × 2 (machine/human advisor) ANOVA with average advice utilization 
as the dependent variable for the first 10 trials. There was no significant interaction between 
advisor and task type F(1,671) = 3.136, p = 0.077, ηp2 = 0.005. There was a main effect of 
task (F(1,671) = 8.775, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.013) that indicated advice was used significantly 
more in the humanitarian (M = 0.561, SD = 0.191) than management task (M = 0.521, SD = 
0.188), see Figure 1 in the appendix. To analyze the second block of trials, we had to account 
for similar or different advisor replacement as well as advisor type and task. We computed 
a variable composed of average advice utilization on the second block of trials and then 
conducted a 2(human/machine advisor) × 2(similar/different advisor replacement) × 
2(humanitarian/management task) ANOVA but found no significant interaction between 
task, advisor, and replacement type, F(1,667) = 0.656, p = 0.418. We conducted a follow-up 
2(humanitarian/management task) × 2(machine/human advisor) ANOVA but we did not 
observe a significant interaction, F(1,667) = 0.320, p = 0.858, or observe a main effect of task 
(p = 0.133) or advisor (p = 0.602). In sum, hypothesis 2 is not supported.
FIGURE 3 Advice Utilization First 10 Trials
Higher values = more advice utilization
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Hypothesis 3a and 3b stated that perceptions of human/machine advisor thought pro-
cess and value similarity would be greater/less in the humanitarian compared to the man-
agement task. For brevity, we used similar analyses to hypothesis 1, but with perceptions of 
value and thought process similarity. In the first block of trials there was no significant inter-
action between advisor and task type for perceptions of thought process similarity, F(1,662) 
= 0.109, p = 0.741, or value similarity, F(1,656) = 0.256, p = 0.613. Tests on the second 
block of trials revealed a significant three-way interaction of task, advisor, and replacement 
type on perceptions of thought process similarity F(1,645) = 7.067, p = 0.008, d = 0.208; 
but not on perceptions of value similarity F(1,634) = 1.236, p = 0.267. Follow-up two-way 
ANOVAs indicated a significant interaction between advisor and replacement type in the 
humanitarian task condition F(1,352) = 38.038, p < 0.001 d = 0.672, but in the management 
task condition this interaction was only marginally significant, F(1,297) = 3.556, p = 0.060, 
d = 0.217. Similar to ratings of advice usefulness (H1b), a human advisor replacing a machine 
advisor resulted in an increase in perceptions of thought process similarity (M = 0.464, 
SD = 1.282), whereas a machine advisor replacing a human resulted in the largest decrease 
(M = –1.156, SD = 1.298). In sum, we find partial support for hypothesis 3a, decision- 
makers do perceive more thought process similarity with human advisors compared to 
machine advisors in humanitarian decision-making scenarios, but only when one advisor 
type has replaced the other. We did not find support for Hypothesis 3b regarding value 
similarity; results are summarized in Table 2.
FIGURE 4 Thought Process Similarity Change from Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more perceived similarity with second advisor
Negative values = less perceived similarity with second advisor
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TABLE 2 Difference Between Rating of First Advisor and Second Advisor,  
Three-Way ANOVAs and Follow-Up
Measure Interaction F p ηp2*
Expertise (H1a)1,2 Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 3.954 0.047 0.006
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 13.966 0.001 0.037
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.100 0.752 0.001
Usefulness (H1b) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 5.494 0.019 0.008
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 7.786 0.006 0.021
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.565 0.453 0.002
Appropriateness (H1c) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 1.381 0.241 0.002
Thought Process Similarity (H3a) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 6.817 0.009 0.011
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 38.369 0.001 0.099
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 3.931 0.048 0.013
Value Similarity (H3b) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 1.202 0.273 0.002
Positive Emotions (RQ1) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 2.528 0.112 0.004
Negative Emotions (RQ1) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 3.888 0.049 0.006
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 4.114 0.043 0.011
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.673 0.413 0.002
Reciprocity (RQ2) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.976 0.324 0.001
Faulting the Advisor (RQ3) Task*Replacement*2nd Advisor 9.659 0.002 0.014
- In Humanitarian Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 12.434 0.001 0.034
- In Management Task Replacement*2nd Advisor 0.814 0.368 0.003
1 Significant three-way interaction graphs in Figure 2.2–5 (Appendix).
2 Bold = significant at the p = 0.05 level.
* Effect size (partial eta-squared).
Hypothesis 4a–4d suggested that the effects posited by hypotheses above would be 
affected by advisor replacement, making the observed effects stronger. Our results above 
effectively answered these questions. We find partial support for hypothesis 4a and 4b (see 
results for H1a, H3a) that referred to perceptions advisor expertise, advice usefulness, 
advice appropriateness, and perceived advisor thought process similarity. Machine advisors 
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that replace human advisors are rated as having less expertise, less useful advice, and having 
less similar thought processes to the decision-maker when they (machine advisors) replace 
human advisors compared to when they replace other machine advisors in the humanitar-
ian task, but this interaction between advisor type and replacement effect is not present in 
the management task. Similarly, human advisors that replace machines are rated as hav-
ing more expertise, advice usefulness, and similar thought processes to the decision-maker 
when they (human advisors) replace machines as opposed to replacing another human; 
again, this effect is present in humanitarian but not management tasks. We do not find that 
ratings of appropriateness are significantly affected by advisor replacement. Hypotheses 4c 
and 4d suggested there would be an effect of advisor replacement type on utilization as well, 
but there was no significant interaction between task, advisor, and replacement type on 
advice utilization (see results for H2), hypotheses 4e and 4f are unsupported.
FIGURE 5 Negative Emotions Change From Advisor 1 to Advisor 2
Positive values = more negative emotions with second advisor
Negative values = less negative emotions with second advisor
With regard to RQ1 (emotions), RQ2 (reciprocity), RQ3 (fault), our analyses above 
suggested that the most interesting investigation would be in the difference between the 
rating of both advisors. We summarize the results of both exploratory paired samples t-tests 
and tests of three-way interactions between task, advisor, and replacement type in Table 3. 
Although these tests have not been corrected for type I error rate, we find them sufficient 
to answer our research questions that both decision-making task and advisor replacement 
type affect the emotions of decision-makers, reciprocity, and fault. 
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TABLE 3 Summary of paired samples t-tests for RQ1-3. MDiff is mean difference  
of second advisor rating—first advisor rating (negative value = less endorsement  
of survey item for second advisor compared to first advisor).
Item 1
Humanitarian Task Management Task
MDiff t Df p MDiff t df p
Positive 
Emotion
MrM -0.09 1.05 76 0.306 -0.092 2.78 74 0.001
MrH 0.09 1.18 102 0.246 -0.03 0.32 80 0.755
HrM -0.34 5.13 107 0.001 -0.16 1.56 71 0.125
HrH -0.15 1.41 71 0.161 -0.03 0.30 73 0.762
Negative 
Emotion*
MrM 0.01 0.12 78 0.90 0.14 2.67 74 0.01
MrH -0.05 0.78 105 0.441 -0.07 0.81 82 0.422
HrM 0.10 1.91 105 0.054 0.02 0.27 70 0.793
HrH 0.14 1.31 70 0.198 -0.09 1.08 74 0.292
Reciprocity
MrM 0.26 2.03 76 0.052 0.08 0.70 74 0.494
MrH 0.74 5.02 102 0.001 0.89 5.08 80 0.001
HrM -0.96 7.62 105 0.001 -0.86 4.22 71 0.001




MrM 0.19 1.43 78 0.160 0.13 1.12 76 0.278
MrH -0.13 1.05 105 0.304 -0.08 0.58 82 0.577
HrM 0.70 4.82 106 0.001 0.35 2.16 72 0.035
HrH 0.40 2.45 71 0.002 -0.07 0.48 75 0.639
1: Advisor/Replacement Type: MrM = Machine Advisor replaced by Machine Advisor (similar replacement 
condition). MrH = Machine replaced by Human Advisor (different replacement condition), etc.
*Advisor Type × Replacement Type × Task Type three-way interaction is significant at the 0.05 level.
2 Bold = significant at the p = 0.05 level.
Discussion
Technological innovation is leading to the increased prevalence of algorithmic, machine 
advice in personal and professional life for decisions of varying demonstrability in fields as 
diverse as medicine, financial advising, and consumer goods. Additionally, machines are 
increasingly replacing human workers, and this trend is being exacerbated by recent events 
including the Covid-19 pandemic and advancements in artificial intelligence (Hayasaki, 
2020). Our results show how the field of human-machine communication can use extant 
research from many communication subfields to inform our understanding of an increas-
ingly automated world. To summarize, our findings show effects relating to the perception 
of an advisor as well as actual advice utilization, although both sets of effects are not always 
related. We found support for our first hypotheses which suggested human advice would 
be perceived as more expert and useful than machine advice for a humanitarian relief plan-
ning decision than a management decision. However, this effect was only significant when 
a machine advisor had replaced a human advisor and vice versa. Our third hypothesis 
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suggested that advisors would also differ across tasks on decision-maker’s perceptions of 
advisor similarity (humans perceived as more similar in humanitarian tasks). We found 
that human advisors were perceived as having more thought process similarity (to the 
decision-maker) but, again, only when the human advisor had replaced an advisor and vice 
versa. We did not find significant effects of task demonstrability or advisor replacement on 
perceptions of advice appropriateness or perceptions of advisor value similarity. There were 
no significant differences in advice-utilization once the decision-makers had their advisors 
replaced. Overall, there are not large effects of task and advisor type on utilization. Finally, 
our research questions showed that decision-maker emotions, reciprocity, and fault can be 
affected by advisor replacement and task type.
Perception and Behavior With Machines
There are a number of potential explanations for why the manipulation of advisor type, 
replacement, and task type may affect perceptions of advisors differently than affecting 
actual utilization behavior. One explanation regards the difficulty and unfamiliarity of the 
task. Interpersonal advice research finds that decision-makers seek and utilize advice more 
when they perceive tasks to be more difficult (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). If decision-makers 
in our experiment perceived the actual act of forecasting as something they were not able 
to do well, it may have driven the utilization of advice regardless of perception of the advi-
sor or perceived quality of the advice. In other words, although one advisor was perceived 
more positively, participants may have still perceived either advisor as more informed than 
themselves. An interesting manipulation for future study is to select easier tasks or tasks on 
which decision-makers perceive themselves to have expertise. People who believe they are 
experts are more prone to overconfidence and advice-discounting in general (Bonaccio & 
Dalal, 2006), and thus, there would be a higher bar toward advice utilization. 
Another potential explanation relating to expertise is the possibility that differing rat-
ings of expertise between advisors in task conditions was due to decision-makers feeling that 
human advisors had more expertise than machines in understanding the consequences of a 
decision (human lives), but not in actually comprehending the forecasting data and produc-
ing an optimal forecast. This is an interesting direction for future study in research compar-
ing human versus machine advice because it may uncover further underlying assumptions 
that decision-makers have about machine and human advisors that are specific to different 
parts of a decision process (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981). In our experiment, the graph stimuli 
remained exactly the same, but the numbers clearly meant something different (lives ver-
sus dollars). Thus, evaluation of the numbers themselves may involve a different cognitive 
process (i.e., information processing) than evaluating their meaning, which is a more judg-
mental process. Utilization of the advice may have reflected a decision-maker’s assessment 
of advisor’s ability to perform one aspect of the decision process, but perceptions of the 
advisor’s expertise and usefulness may reflect an assessment of a different process such as 
judgment. Expectations of machines play a critical role in predicting detrimental behaviors 
such as over- or under-reliance on machines (Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007), and a better 
understanding of what aspects of the decision-making process these expectations refer to 
may lead to better machine advisor design and integration. 
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Emotion and Machines
Another potential moderator between perception and behavior is decision-maker emotions. 
We examined both positive and negative emotions due to past research showing emotion’s 
effect on decision-maker perceptions and utilization (de Hooge et al., 2014). Our results 
showed a significant effect of task on negative emotions, but perhaps the more interesting 
result is that for positive emotions there was only one condition that produced an increase 
in positive emotions: when a human advisor replaced a machine advisor on humanitarian 
tasks. In the same task, machines replacing a human produced the largest decrease in pos-
itive emotions (see Table 3 for mean differences). These results should be interpreted with 
caution because they did not result in significant omnibus effects, but there is a clear direc-
tion implied—decision-makers are not feeling positive emotions when machines replace a 
human advisor when making a less demonstrable decision. In our study and interpersonal 
advice research in general, it is unclear how emotions are tied to utilization behavior. For 
example, Gino and Schweitzer (2008) found that inducing anxiety led to more advice utili-
zation, but de Hooge et al. (2014) found that negative emotions resulted in lower perceived 
expertise of an advisor and lower utilization. Our results show that emotion is an important 
area for future research, especially because the emotional reaction to receiving advice seems 
to differ between human and machine advisors.
Human Similarity and Liking
Perceived advisor similarity is another set of findings that provide insight into the compli-
cated relationship between humans and machines. Advisor thought process similarity rat-
ings for human advisors increased more when they replaced machine advisors. Although 
we do not know if decision-makers are consciously comparing one advisor to the other, 
a large amount of contrast effect research suggests this process happens unconsciously 
(Palmer & Gore, 2014). Perceived similarity does generally result in more liking (Strauss et 
al., 2010) and the implication of this is not only that humans may like human advisors that 
replace machines, but that humans do not like machines that replace other humans. This is 
an important area for future research; there is conflicting survey evidence about how much 
the average people like the idea of machines replacing humans (Savela et al., 2017), and 
some field research suggests that machines are sometimes welcomed as a replacement to 
humans (Wasen, 2010) or desired not to replace humans (Kristoffersson et al., 2011).
Human advisors also may be liked more in general because our results show that 
decision-makers feel more reciprocity (i.e., “I owe something to my advisor”) toward human 
advisors. This is quite a remarkable result if one considers that our manipulation of human 
versus machine advisor was very minimal in this experiment. While agency and influence 
(Banks & de Graaf, 2020) were present for the advisor, there was almost no interactivity 
with either advisor nor was there any conversational wording added to the advice; it was 
simply delivered as a number. In conjunction with our results regarding advisor perception 
above, this result has important implications for human-machine trust theory—especially 
continued efforts to investigate what degree people see machines as social actors (Gambino 
et al., 2020). Our results suggest that even our small manipulation with no social interaction 
leads to very different assessments of a social feeling like reciprocity.
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Research Implications and Conclusion
Our results also have real-world implications. If a human is replaced by a machine in the 
workplace, the interpersonal advice process clearly is a more social process than the human 
advisor in this experiment. Yet, our experiment revealed this perception of a social process 
is substantially different for human versus machine advisors despite the advice being hardly 
social at all thus. In settings outside the lab, there are likely to be several differences between 
human and machine advice that would act as confounds if not controlled in a laboratory 
setting. Our experiment removed the confounds introduced by actual real-world social 
relationships between humans that exist in the workplace, and thus this was a very conser-
vative comparison of humans versus machine. When humans with real relationships are 
replaced by machines, perhaps these elements of social interaction are not “replaced,” but 
actually “lost” instead. Humans are social creatures and the feeling that someone is helping 
you is a good one. There could be serious long-term consequences to the lost positive emo-
tions that come from social interaction, everything from organizational commitment to 
productivity (Oswald et al., 2015) is at risk when employees are not happy at work. Moving 
forward, gaining a more thorough understanding of what happens socially and emotionally 
when a human colleague is replaced by machines is critical.
Additional real-world implications of our study are numerous. It is clear that humans 
do not like it when machines replace a human advisor, even a human advisor who is 
zero-acquaintance and only imagined. Furthermore, our results suggest that decision- 
makers really do not like it when this replacement occurs on a task that is less demonstrable. 
But the negative feelings experienced when machines replace a human do not necessarily 
mean that the machine advisor will be used less than the human advisor. If anything, our 
utilization results suggested machine advisors were used more in the humanitarian task, 
the same task that produced the most negative evaluations of the machine advisor when 
it replaced a human. Understanding how the manipulation of advisor characteristics, sit-
uational context, decision-maker self-efficacy, and advice accuracy affect this complicated 
relationship is important if machine advisors are to be effectively introduced into the areas 
they are being developed for including health care, financial advising, and disaster manage-
ment. These industries are just a few of the many which will see the increased presence of 
machine advisors—and this trend is only projected to increase as the Covid-19 pandemic 
has dramatically increased corporate efforts to automate workforces. In conclusion, our 
research shows the process of replacing human advisors with machines will be complicated. 
Moreover, our research shows that it is not only the humans who are replaced that will be 
unhappy; the people who must work with these new machines may not be happy either.
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1: Additional Methods Information
Design Considerations. Our literature review revealed the need for careful design. For 
example, research on how the perceived machine suitability for societal roles is affected by 
anthropomorphism has important design implications. First, we do not anthropomorphize 
the machine in order to provide the cleanest manipulation of advisor type. Second, we limit 
the social aspects of the advice exchange process; there is no direct interaction with either 
advisor type, and advice is delivered in a simple text format. Additional design implications 
are based on above review of advisor expertise—we avoid creating implied expertise by 
clearly introducing the human and machine advisors as having equivalent expertise. We 
also precisely control the accuracy of advice to rule out the confound of an advisor actually 
being better at a decision-making task. Our design therefore is optimized to discover differ-
ing assumptions that people have about the attributes of machines versus humans on tasks 
of different demonstrability.
Survey Measures. The questionnaire measures were identical and measured perceptions 
of advice usefulness and advisor quality on a sematic differential scale. Additionally, Likert 
survey questions measured emotions when receiving advice, trust of advisor, similarity 
(value, social norm, and thought process) to advisor, and perceptions of advisor effort.
Positive emotions were measured with four Likert questions on a 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely) scale for four positive emotions: Appreciative, Happy, Grateful, Thankful. The 
negative emotion scale was composed of Mad, Frustrated, Annoyed, Irritated. The four 
positive and negative emotion questions produced sufficient reliability (positive: α = 0.940, 
negative: α = 0.943), and the mean was used as an index of positive/negative emotion. Four 
sematic differential questions were used to measure advice usefulness (e.g., thoughtful, use-
ful); and achieved sufficient reliability (α = 0.811) and is hereon presented as an index of 
advice usefulness. Finally, in order to keep the survey a reasonable length, a pair of ques-
tions was asked to assess feelings of reciprocity to the advisor (i.e., “I feel like I owe some-
thing to my advisor for their help”).
Advisor Descriptions. We pilot-tested 20 descriptions (10 human, 10 machines) with 
23 undergraduate students and selected the descriptions that were closest to one another in 
ratings of perceived expertise, clarity, and performance expectancy.
Intellective (high demonstrability) Task: Machine. Your advisor today is a computer pro-
gram called OptiLytics. OptiLytics is a software program used by the Gain Healthcare Sys-
tem to help with forecasting. The statistical models in OptiLytics have been built using 
10 years of past Gain Healthcare data, as well as some data from the Center for Disease 
Control in the United States.
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Intellective (high demonstrability) Task: Human. Your advisor today is Logan Girard. 
Logan is a medical doctor who has been working for Gain Healthcare for 10 years doing 
operating room management and hospital operations. Prior to joining Gain, Logan gained 
experience in healthcare management with the Center for Disease Control in the United 
States. 
Judgmental (low demonstrability) Task: Machine. Your adviser today is a computer pro-
gram called ReliefLytics. ReliefLytics is a computer program used by the UNHCR to help 
with forecasting. The statistical models in ReliefLytics have been built using 10 years of past 
UN data, as well as some data from the Center for Disease Control in the United States.
Judgmental (low demonstrability) Task: Human. Your adviser today is Logan Girard. 
Logan is a medical doctor who has been working for the UNHCR for 10 years doing camp 
management and emergency relief. Prior to joining the UNHCR, Logan gained experience 
managing medical crises in developing nations while working for the Center for Disease 
Control in the United States. 
2: Power Analysis
A power analysis for the comparison between human and machine advisors was conducted 
using G*Power 3.1 and drew upon the three studies determined to be most similar to 
the research proposed (Dietvorst et al., 2015; Önkal et al., 2009; Prahl & Van Swol, 2017). 
Although these studies did not all report repeated measures results, the effect sizes were cal-
culated as best as possible using published data. Dietvorst et al., reported effect sizes of 0.52 
(Study 1) and 0.55 (Study 2); Önkal et al. effect size was calculated at 0.82; and Prahl & Van 
Swol reported a Cohen’s d of 0.42. Of these, the most conservative estimate of total sample 
size needed by using the Prahl & Van Swol study, with G*Power calculating a needed N = 
142 at alpha = 0.95 and a desired power of 0.80. Due to the well-known tendency of fore-
casting studies to experience high subject attrition due to missing data or the drawbacks of 
the weight of advice measure (for review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Prahl & Van Swol, 
2017; Tzioti et al., 2014) the target n is 162 in each advisor/task condition (human/machine 
& high/low demonstrability), leading to a total N = 648. Given the lack of previous studies, 
we have no power analyses for the advisor replacement effects, but subjects will be split into 
replacement conditions in each advisor/task condition and, given equivalent effect sizes, 
the above sample should be adequate. 
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3.1: Task Screenshots 1: Initial Forecast
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3.2: Task Screenshots 2: Feedback Screen
